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Abstract 
This paper aims shedding more light in the understanding and the study of fiscal 
vulnerability. Therefore, it presents a methodology of assessing vulnerability of fiscal policy 
using a public debt dynamic equation which allows estimating the primary balance that 
stabilizes public debt. Calculating the primary gap represented by the difference between the 
stabilizing and the current primary balance, it can be indicated fiscal vulnerability. It is used 
annual data ranged for 1971 and 2010 and investigated the vulnerability of fiscal policy for 
the case of 10 advanced economies in the European Union. The results showed only a few 
episodes of more severe fiscal vulnerability occurring after the financial turmoil. Most of the 
data analyzed indicates a normal state of fiscal vulnerability that is not induced by the 
government’s failure in achieving the stabilizing primary balance but by not aiming at the 
stabilization of the public debt.  
 
Keywords: Fiscal policy, primary balance, public debt, intertemporal budget constraint, 
fiscal sustainability 
 
Introduction 
There is a rich body of research showing that fiscal policy has confronted various 
issues for the last decades: growing social spending (Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry and 
Qureshi, 2011), increasing public debt (Scott, 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011), ageing 
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population (Corsetti and Roubini, 1996; Alesina, 2000; Kotlikoff and Hagist, 2005), solvency 
risk exposure (Ciarlone and Trebeschi, 2006). Thus, it is believed that fiscal policy is 
vulnerable and it has some difficulties in absorbing various exogenous shocks that might 
occur. As a matter of fact, the recent financial turmoil that hit worldwide and the severe 
economic recession that followed suggested such vulnerability, but this assumption is 
counterintuitive to some extent.    Therefore, the question that naturally arises is how we can 
better understand fiscal vulnerability. The aim of this paper is to shed some light in the study 
of fiscal vulnerability by elucidating the conceptual framework and by presenting a way of 
assessment. For the purpose of achieving its goal, this paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 gives the theoretical background and also describes the model used for the study of fiscal 
vulnerability. Section 3 reports the dataset and the empirical results for the advanced 
European Union economies. The last section presents the concluding remarks of the study. 
The Theoretical Background and the Model of Fiscal Vulnerability: 
Stoian (2011a, b) reviewed the existing literature investigating fiscal vulnerability and 
found only a few papers discussing in more detail this concept.  She also indicated the use of 
related terms such as fiscal risk (Brixi, Shalatov and Zlaoui, 2000) which describes any 
change that goes to an increase of government’s payment obligations, hence inducing a 
certain risk that might generate excessive fiscal deficits and public debt stocks in the long run 
or fiscal fragility and fiscal stress (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2010; Baldacci, McHugh and 
Petrova, 2011; Baldacci, Petrova, Belhocine, Dobrescu and Mazraani, 2011). Only Hemming 
and Petrie (2000), and Hemming, Kell and Schimmelpfennig (2003) formulated a 
comprehensive definition of fiscal vulnerability considering government’s ability to avoid 
excessive fiscal deficits and publics debt stocks that can threaten macroeconomic stability in 
the short run and fiscal sustainability in the long run, to design a flexible fiscal policy that 
assures the immediate reaction to domestic and external disequilibrium, and to assure stable 
and proper taxation rate that allows for collecting sufficient fiscal revenues for the public 
budget. The rest of literature studying the vulnerability from the financial crisis perspective 
(Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; Frankel and Saravelos, 2010; Hayes, 2011) suggests 
that a country is more vulnerable when there is a liquidity or solvency risk, or if it 
experiences larger output drops, bugger stock market falls, greater currency weakness, larger 
loss in reserves, or the need for access to International Monetary Fund financial assistance, or 
if it relies mostly on short term debt to be serviced or external debt, or it has large 
government deficits.  
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Considering previous argues, it can be concluded that fiscal policy is said to be 
vulnerable whenever the intertemporal government budget constraint cannot be fulfilled, 
hence exposing the economy to fiscal solvency risk. The study of fiscal vulnerability 
generally starts with this assumption and tries to investigate the factors that could cause the 
violation of this condition.  In that sense, it is recalled the paper of Rial and Vicente (2004) 
who examined the vulnerability of Uruguayan fiscal policy using the sensitivity analysis of 
public debt to changes in economic growth rate, interest rate or exchange rate considered as 
affecting the public debt dynamic. Also, Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova (2011) and Baldacci, 
Petrova, Belhocine, Dobrescu and Mazraani (2011) introduced a fiscal vulnerability index 
that measures the degree of fiscal vulnerability on a continuous basis as departure of key 
fiscal variables from their historical “norms”, defined as 10-year cross-country averages. 
Therefore, one can assess fiscal vulnerability using the public debt dynamic equation. 
At time t, the government borrows money (Bt) to finance the primary deficit (the difference 
between primary expenditures, Gt, and government revenues, Vt), interest payment (i·Bt-1), 
and public debt from previous year (Bt-1) from the previous year: 
11 −− ⋅++−= ttttt BiBRGB          (1) 
 where: 
 i: nominal interest rate. 
Rearranging equation (1), it is obtained: 
11 −− ⋅+−=− ttttt BiRGBB          (2) 
Considering the variables as ratios to GDP (small caps denote that) and using GDP 
deflator (Pt) and real GDP (Yt), equation 2 becomes: 
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 Where: 
 pt=primary balance-to-GDP ratio (-surplus; +deficit), at time t. 
If government confronts increasing public debt and/or large indebtedness ratio over 
the time, in order to fulfill the intertemporal government budget constraint in the long run, it 
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will aim at stabilizing public debt. Thus, it ensures that public debt-to-GDP ratio remains 
unchanged (bt = bt-1). Hence, equation (4) becomes: 
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 Where: 
 pt=primary balance-to-GDP ratio (+surplus; -deficit), at time t. 
There is a large debated around the time t for which government chooses to stabilize 
the public debt. Theoretically speaking, the adjustment should be immediate also implying a 
very flexible fiscal policy that can generate the required primary surplus at the very moment 
when public debt increases in order to prevent its growth. But there are also some operational 
delays that might occur (McConnell and Brue (1996) details these aspects). Thus, it is 
considered acceptable the efforts to stabilize the public debt at the level from previous time 
(t-1).     
Rearranging terms in equation (5), it is obtained: 
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Considering small variations of π·g, equation (6) can be re-written as: 
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 Equation (7) gives the primary balance that should be achieved by governments if it 
aims at stabilizing public debt. In order to study fiscal vulnerability, it compares the 
stabilizing primary balance (pt*) with the current one (pt). It can be stated that fiscal policy is 
vulnerable when pt*> pt. This implies that government was not able to achieve the required 
primary balance to stabilize the public debt, hence issuing more government bonds in order to 
service its payment obligations. Consequently, if public debt continuously increases and 
government cannot fulfill the primary surplus, fiscal solvency will be affected in the long run.   
 Our methodology relies to some extent on primary gap suggested by Blanchard 
(1990) for the study fiscal sustainability. Pasinetti also employed a similar methodology in 
his 1998 work. The distinction between the approach proposed in this paper and previous 
methods is that it calculates the required primary balance on annual basis considering that 
government plan in stabilizing public debt at the level from the previous year. Then, it is 
made yearly comparison between the two levels of the primary balance. Hence, it is detected 
each year when fiscal policy was vulnerable. If government systematically fails in achieving 
European Scientific Journal    March 2013 edition vol.9, No.7    ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
5 
 
the stabilizing primary balance for many consecutive years, then it can be stated that fiscal 
sustainability in the long run could be affected.  
Empirical Evidence for EU Countries: 
This methodology is applied for studying fiscal vulnerability in the case of advanced 
European Union countries which have already joined the Monetary Union. Considering that 
the public debt dynamic equation assumes that government issues debt in local currency, it is 
believed that focusing on euro zone member states fulfills this hypothesis. There are also 
many papers pointing to unsustainable and pro-cyclical fiscal policy of the advanced EU 
economies. Moreover, looking at the statistical annual data for public debt-to-GDP ratio 
ranged on 1990-2010 and provided by Eurostat, it is found interesting insights (see Table 1).  
Table 1   Descriptive statistics for public debt (% GDP) before and after Maastricht Treaty (MT) 
Country 
Average All 
Data 
Standard 
deviation All 
Data 
Average  
Before MT 
Standard 
deviation  
Before MT 
Average  
After MT 
Standard 
deviation  
After MT 
Belgium 97.37 26.30 89.34 29.94 107.64 16.64 
Germany 44.84 17.42 31.54 9.28 61.85 8.62 
Ireland 66.60 26.76 77.20 23.30 53.06 26.06 
Greece 66.23 37.99 36.75 21.15 103.89 12.89 
Spain 38.89 18.59 26.66 13.91 54.51 9.96 
France 46.13 18.37 28.67 6.41 61.65 9.90 
Italy 87.45 26.73 68.25 19.69 111.99 6.63 
Netherlands 60.11 13.15 59.81 15.53 60.40 11.11 
Austria 49.83 17.93 37.79 15.27 65.22 3.43 
Portugal 48.87 15.69 39.79 14.96 58.96 8.96 
Source: author’s estimation based on annual data for public debt-to-GDP ratio available from Eurostat 
Note: All data- data spanned between 1970-1992 with some exceptions (France-1977; The Netherlands-1975; 
Portugal-1973); Before Maastricht Treaty (MT)-data spanned between 1970-1992 with some exceptions (France-
1977; The Netherlands-1975; Portugal-1973); After Maastricht Treaty (MT)-data spanned between 1993-2010 
 
All the EU countries considered for this study had on average annual public debt-to-
GDP ratio larger than 40%, except Finland. It is difficult to establish a threshold beyond that 
public debt may negatively affect the national economy or how much a government can 
borrow to finance its payment obligations without exposing the economy to fiscal solvency 
risks. Balassone, Franco and Zotteri (2004) argued that governments might impose deficit 
limits in order to control debt level. The enforcement of Maastricht Treaty (MT) brings also 
the limits for the deficit and for public debt. However, a closely look to the data before and 
after introducing MT reveals that for most of the countries investigated, the average of annual 
public debt-to-GDP-ratio after 1992 is higher than the average ratio before enforcing MT, and 
it is also larger than 60% of GDP for most of them, thus suggesting some fiscal solvency risk 
exposure. In addition, there are many studies indicating that fiscal policy in the European 
Union is mildly pro-cyclical and unsustainable in the long run (Afonso, 2000; Afonso and 
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Rault, 2008; Fatas and Mihov, 2009; Afonso, Agnello, Furceri and Sousa; Balassone et al, 
2009).  
Given this context, it is considered important to investigate whether fiscal policy is 
vulnerable from the perspective of public debt stabilization. Hence, it is estimated the 
stabilizing primary balance (pt*) based on equation (7) and using annual data for the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio, nominal interest rate on public debt, real GDP growth rate and inflation 
rate (as changes in GDP deflator) extracted from 1971-2010 (if available) from Eurostat. It is 
also calculated the difference between the stabilizing and the current primary balance (pt*-pt). 
The results are reported in Table 2: 
Table 2 The gap between the stabilizing primary and the current primary balance 
Year Austria Belgium Germany Spain France Greece Ireland Italy 
The 
Netherlands Portugal 
1971 na -2.36 -1.94 na na na na Na na na 
1972 na -1.95 -1.32 na na na na Na na na 
1973 na -3.58 -3.06 na na na na Na na na 
1974 na -5.98 0.32 na na na na Na na na 
1975 na -1.59 4.31 na na na na Na na na 
1976 1.33 -1.20 1.35 na na na na Na na na 
1977 -0.47 1.22 0.86 na na na na Na na na 
1978 0.75 2.17 0.71 na -0.90 na na Na -1.00 1.34 
1979 -0.63 3.99 0.51 na -2.43 na na Na -0.16 -0.32 
1980 -0.83 3.79 1.25 na -2.42 na na -5.71 1.02 -0.36 
1981 -0.52 11.72 2.39 na -0.24 na na 0.73 2.61 2.83 
1982 0.63 5.08 1.98 na -0.19 na na 0.10 4.06 -0.08 
1983 1.65 8.63 1.18 na -0.20 na na 0.10 3.24 -5.02 
1984 0.44 2.36 0.09 na 0.46 na na 2.07 2.30 -4.14 
1985 0.10 2.89 -0.62 na 0.86 na 2.37 3.49 0.95 -1.74 
1986 1.23 4.44 -0.99 na 0.87 na 4.19 3.56 2.43 -3.96 
1987 2.32 2.86 0.72 na 0.39 na 0.68 3.73 4.76 -2.56 
1988 0.70 -1.43 -0.21 na 0.10 -0.46 -4.04 1.53 0.97 -5.98 
1989 -0.79 -2.92 -2.89 na -0.61 1.70 -9.18 2.73 0.53 -6.00 
1990 -1.57 -0.74 -1.51 na 0.65 1.45 -4.50 1.65 0.80 -3.68 
Table 2 The gap between the stabilizing primary and the current primary balance (continued) 
Year Austria Belgium Germany Spain France Greece Ireland Italy 
The 
Netherlands Portugal 
1991 -1.05 1.19 -0.46 na 1.63 -4.95 -0.74 2.58 -1.65 -0.73 
1992 -1.16 1.65 -0.42 na 3.22 -0.28 -2.96 4.90 0.79 -2.47 
1993 2.56 3.44 1.72 na 6.19 1.80 -4.48 6.65 0.47 4.96 
1994 1.89 -2.07 -0.06 na 3.73 -4.67 -5.02 2.16 -0.60 2.49 
1995 2.85 -0.35 7.79 1.82 3.75 -2.40 -8.52 -2.23 5.16 0.46 
1996 1.84 1.53 2.47 1.05 2.48 -2.86 -8.07 -0.47 -1.77 0.83 
1997 0.53 -3.66 1.39 -0.84 1.44 -4.34 -11.35 -2.93 -3.88 -1.16 
1998 -0.26 -3.82 0.62 -1.34 -0.06 -4.81 -11.15 -2.06 -3.10 -1.11 
1999 -0.16 -3.92 -0.07 -3.13 -0.24 -3.44 -9.85 -2.14 -4.66 -0.82 
2000 -1.51 -6.42 -2.83 -4.13 -1.65 -4.18 -11.48 -5.57 -6.72 -0.48 
2001 -1.62 -3.65 1.40 -3.89 -0.76 -2.90 -4.88 -2.22 -3.44 1.53 
2002 -1.35 -3.59 2.78 -3.34 1.14 -2.16 -3.33 -1.34 0.09 0.45 
2003 0.11 -2.80 3.44 -3.52 2.29 -3.86 -2.61 0.14 1.86 1.72 
2004 1.69 -4.95 2.33 -3.14 0.97 0.25 -3.32 -0.83 0.25 1.20 
2005 -1.31 -1.07 2.31 -4.47 0.36 0.21 -4.07 1.32 -2.08 4.01 
2006 -1.68 -4.79 -0.95 -5.40 -0.79 -1.87 -5.36 -0.73 -3.19 1.43 
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2007 -3.05 -4.24 -3.20 -4.57 -0.30 -1.28 -2.02 -2.78 -2.61 -0.37 
2008 -1.95 -1.04 -1.95 2.92 1.37 3.88 8.06 0.72 -2.79 1.55 
2009 5.10 7.79 6.10 12.71 8.20 14.92 19.48 8.09 7.80 11.08 
2010 3.05 3.41 2.70 9.93 6.23 8.56 34.20 2.17 5.29 6.59 
It can be stated that each time pt*-pt≤0 implies that fiscal policy is not vulnerable 
because government managed to achieve or to exceed the stabilizing primary balance. 
Assuming that governments of these countries aimed at stabilizing the public debt at the level 
from the previous year, the results show when they failed in realizing the required primary 
surplus allowing the fulfillment of this goal. It is also reported some statistics about the fiscal 
vulnerability episodes in Table 3: 
Table 3   Fiscal vulnerability statistics for EU countries 
Country 
Observations 
(total) 
Fiscal 
vulnerability 
(all) 
% of total 
observations 
Fiscal 
vulnerability 
Before MT 
% of 
observations 
before MT 
Fiscal 
vulnerability 
After MT 
% of 
observations 
after MT 
Belgium 
1971:2010 40 17 42.50 13 32.50 4 10.00 
Germany 
1971:2010 40 24 60.00 12 30.00 12 30.00 
Ireland 
1985:2010 26 6 23.08 3 11.54 3 11.54 
Greece 
1988:2010 23 8 34.78 2 8.70 6 26.09 
Spain 
1995:2010 16 5 31.25 0 0.00 5 31.25 
France 
1978:2010 33 20 60.61 8 24.24 12 36.36 
Italy 
1980:2010 31 19 61.29 12 38.71 7 22.58 
Netherlands 
1976:2010 35 19 54.29 12 34.29 7 20.00 
Austria 
1976:2010 35 17 48.57 8 22.86 9 25.71 
Portugal 
1977:2010 34 15 44.12 2 5.88 13 38.24 
Source: author’s estimation based on annual data for i, π,g and bt-1  available from Eurostat. 
Notes: Before Maastricht Treaty (MT)-data before1992; After Maastricht Treaty (MT)-data after 1992. 
            Implicit interest rate (i) is derived as nominal interest expenditure divided by previous period debt stock. 
  
It is noticed that only in the cases of Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands, the 
results indicate fiscal vulnerability for more than half of the period investigated.  Considering 
the public debt limit imposed by MT, it is also found that only for the case of Belgium, Italy 
and the Netherlands, fiscal policy was more vulnerable before enforcing the Maastricht 
Treaty. In the case of Greece, Spain, France, Austria and Portugal, the 60% of GDP 
constraint hasn’t made fiscal policy less vulnerable than before 1992. Balassone and Franco 
(2000) pointed out that achieving the two required criteria of the Maastricht Treaty allows for 
fiscal discipline and flexibility and excludes any bias from an unsustainable fiscal policy. 
But, the empirical evidence seems that disproves Balassone and Franco’s point of view. 
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We can also report the results of gap distribution (see Table 4): 
Table 4  Gap distribution 
Austria  Mean  Obs. Greece  Mean  Obs. 
[-4, -2) -3.05 1 [-5, 0) -2.96 15 
[-2, 0) -1.05 16 [0, 5) 1.55 6 
[0, 2) 0.99 13 [5, 10) 8.56 1 
[2, 4) 2.70 4 [10, 15) 14.92 1 
[4, 6) 5.10 1 All -0.51 23 
All 0.25 35 Ireland  Mean  Obs. 
Belgium  Mean  Obs. [-20, -10) -11.32 3 
[-10, -5) -6.20 2 [-10, 0) -4.88 17 
[-5, 0) -2.65 21 [0, 10) 3.82 4 
[0, 5) 2.69 13 [10, 20) 19.48 1 
[5, 10) 7.17 3 [30, 40) 34.20 1 
[10, 15) 11.72 1 All -1.84 26 
All 0.00 40 Italy  Mean  Obs. 
Germany  Mean  Obs. [-10, -5) -5.64 2 
[-5, 0) -1.40 16 [-5, 0) -1.77 10 
[0, 5) 1.67 22 [0, 5) 1.98 17 
[5, 10) 6.95 2 [5, 10) 7.37 2 
All 0.71 40 All 0.63 31 
Spain  Mean  Obs. 
The 
Netherlands  Mean  Obs. 
[-10, -5) -5.40 1 [-10, -5) -6.72 1 
[-5, 0) -3.24 10 [-5, 0) -2.45 15 
[0, 5) 1.93 3 [0, 5) 1.70 16 
[5, 10) 9.93 1 [5, 10) 6.09 3 
[10, 15) 12.71 1 All 0.05 35 
All -0.58 16 Portugal  Mean  Obs. 
France  Mean  Obs. [-10, -5) -5.66 3 
[-5, 0) -0.83 13 [-5, 0) -1.71 16 
[0, 5) 1.51 17 [0, 5) 1.91 13 
[5, 10) 6.87 3 [5, 10) 6.59 1 
All 1.08 33 [10, 15) 11.08 1 
      All -0.05 34 
 
The results show how gap values distributed on various ranges. Only positive values 
suggest fiscal vulnerability. It can be looked after the ranges consisting in the highest 
frequent positive gaps considering that these may indicate a normal state of fiscal 
vulnerability. The mean calculated for these ranges also shows the value to which the gap 
converges when fiscal policy is normally vulnerable. Hence, for most of the countries 
investigated it is found that the gap between the stabilizing and the current primary balance 
which has the highest positive value lies between 0 and 5 p.p., except the Austria’s case for 
which the range is between 0 and 2 p.p. and Ireland with a range between 0 and 10 p.p. These 
ranges indicate a normal state of fiscal vulnerability in the sense that even if governments fail 
in achieving the stabilizing primary balance they might have not aimed at stabilization of 
public debt. The figure below illustrates the fiscal vulnerability for each country under 
analysis:   
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Fiscal vulnerability ranges for EU countries 
 
 
 
The shadowed area indicates normal fiscal vulnerability. The values lying above this 
area point towards more severe fiscal vulnerability and are represented by positive gaps 
having extreme values. It can be noticed there are only a few years when the primary gap 
recoded extreme values. Most of them are observed after financial turmoil hit worldwide 
indicating that fiscal policy has difficulties in absorbing the shock of increasing public debt. 
For the cases of Austria, Belgium Germany and the Netherlands fiscal policy turned into a 
severe vulnerable state in 2009, two years after financial crisis occurred, whilst the rest of the 
countries investigated became fiscal vulnerable one year earlier. 
Conclusion 
The recent financial crisis that turned into a severe economic recession requires a 
flexible fiscal policy which has the capacity for response immediately and as it is expected to 
various shocks that might occur and that could affect fiscal solvency. There is a rich literature 
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showing that fiscal policy has confronted multiple difficulties over the last decades that 
diminished its ability of reaction and increased its vulnerability. Hence, it is strongly believed 
that the understanding and the study of fiscal vulnerability represents a major topic to be 
discussed. The aim of this paper was to shed some light on the concept of fiscal vulnerability 
considering that the existing knowledge provided only few comprehensive definitions in that 
sense. The general accepted view is that fiscal vulnerability describes government’s ability to 
generate primary surplus to service its payment obligations in the future. Hence, it is strongly 
related to the fulfillment of the intertemporal government budget constraint and also with the 
achievement of fiscal sustainability in the long run. The study of fiscal vulnerability indicates 
the factors that might affect fiscal solvency in short term. If government postpones 
adjustment actions and it runs a vulnerable fiscal policy for many consecutive years, then the 
exposure to solvency risk will increase and fiscal sustainability is jeopardized. Therefore, it 
presents a methodology of studying fiscal vulnerability based on public debt dynamic 
equation and assuming that the government aims at stabilizing public debt. It is asserted that 
this approach fits the developments observed for the key fiscal variables in many of the 
advanced economies in the last decades: growing budgetary deficits and increasing public 
debt. Given this context, it is believed that governments should have considered the 
possibility to stop or to slow down public debt growth. For this reason, it is estimated the 
primary balance that stabilizes public debt at the level from the previous year, hereby 
allowing for one lag in government’s reaction due to operational delays. Then it is compared 
the stabilizing with the current primary balance. The positive primary gap indicates fiscal 
vulnerability in the sense that government wasn’t able to achieve the required primary 
balance which is also consistent with the stabilization of public debt. It is investigated fiscal 
vulnerability for 10 advanced economies of the European Union which also adopted a single 
currency. It is also found that indebtedness ratio after introducing the Maastricht Treaty was 
larger than before (except Ireland) and also higher than 60% of GDP. It uses annual data 
ranged on 1971 and 2010 (if available for each country under analysis). The results showed 
the time when fiscal policy was vulnerable. Examining the distribution of primary gap it is 
determined the values for which fiscal policy confronts more severe vulnerability. It is 
considered that the ranges consisting in positive primary gaps most frequent describe a state 
of normal fiscal vulnerability, while the ranges comprising extreme positive values indicate 
more severe fiscal vulnerability. It is observed only a few episodes of more severe fiscal 
vulnerability mostly occurring after the financial turmoil. The rest of them illustrate normal 
fiscal vulnerability induced not necessarily by government’s failure in accomplishing the 
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stabilizing primary balance, but by not aiming at the stabilization of public debt. The 
government likes playing Ponzi games in the sense of postponing the achievement of primary 
surplus to reduce public debt or to keep its pace of growth down to zero.  Exposing fiscal 
policy to solvency risk for many consecutive years may negatively affect fiscal sustainability 
in the long run.   
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